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Lecture

Professional Responsibility in Appellate
Practice: A View From the Bench
Honorable Roger J. Miner*
During my thirteen years of service as a United States
Court of Appeals Judge, I have witnessed a general deterioration in the quality of appellate advocacy. This deterioration has
been accompanied by, and is in large part attributable to, a decline in the attention paid to the rules of ethical conduct governing appellate practice. It is my intention in this Lecture to
identify the rules of professional responsibility that have been
most disregarded by the appellate bar in recent years, to describe how these rules have been violated, and to suggest methods that would encourage and enforce adherence to ethical
standards in appellate practice. My discussion of these matters
will center on the duty of professional competence and the role
of appellate judges in overseeing compliance by the Bar with
the governing ethical standards. I shall also argue for an extension of certain of these standards.
* Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Adjunct Professor of Law, Albany Law School.
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What follows, of course, are my own thoughts and observations. I have not sought the concurrence of any of my colleagues
or any other appellate judges. Also, my references to the Code
of Professional Responsibility will be to the Code adopted by the
four New York Appellate Divisions and presently in force in this
state.' The local rules of my court, which hears appeals from all
the United States District Courts in New York, Connecticut and
Vermont and reviews certain administrative rulings, establish
a disciplinary committee. The committee is charged to deal
with misconduct "in respect to any professional matter before
this court that allegedly violates the rules of professional conduct or responsibility in effect in the state or other jurisdiction
2
where the attorney maintains his or her principal office." I
must confess that as Chairman of our Rules Committee I was
partially responsible for this multilateral concept of an ethical
code. I am happy to note, however, that the Judicial Conference
of the United States is considering rules of attorney conduct
that would apply to all the federal courts in the nation. 3 In any
event, I think that the New York Rules are representative
enough for my purposes here.
Ethical considerations first come into play for the appellate
lawyer in the decision on whether to undertake representation
on appeal. This is often a difficult question for the attorney.
The Code prohibits unwarranted appeals, 4 and frivolous appeals are sanctionable under the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure. 5 On the other hand, the Code requires diligent and
zealous prosecution of arguably meritorious appeals. 6 My own
view on this issue is that far too many frivolous appeals and far
too many non-meritorious issues are presented to appellate
tribunals.

1. See N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, introduction (1992) [hereinafter N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY].
2. 2D CIR. R. 46(h)(2).
3. See Hal R. Leiberman & Ronald C. Minkoff, Federal Judicial Conference
ConsidersNew Rules of Attorney Conduct, N.Y. L. J., Oct. 14, 1998, at 1, 6.
4. See N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(2).
5. See FED. R. ApP. P. 38.
6. See N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7.
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An examination of the volume of Anders7 briefs filings supports my view. It will be recalled that in Anders v. California
the Supreme Court recognized that, in appropriate circumstances, assigned counsel for indigent appellants in criminal
cases may withdraw from representation. Certain requirements were established in connection with the withdrawal process: counsel must conduct a conscientious examination leading
to his or her opinion that the case is wholly frivolous; the request to withdraw must be accompanied by a brief that refers to
any arguable basis for appeal in the record; and the appellate
court itself must determine that there are no issues worthy of
appeal.8
Of the 850 criminal appeals filed in the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in 1997, 9 eighty-two were accompanied by Anders briefs. 10 A few of these applications were rejected by the
court, as they are each year." These rejections have resulted in
some cases in the denial of legal fees for the authors of the deficient briefs and the appointment of substitute counsel.' 2 However, the Anders applications are granted in the vast majority of
cases, leading to summary affirmance of convictions in criminal
appeals totally without merit.' 3
If appointed counsel for indigent appellants presenting Anders briefs and the appellate courts that examine these briefs
can undertake searching examinations of the record and find no
basis for appeal in a substantial number of cases, how many
meritless appeals must there be in civil and criminal cases in
which appellants are represented by retained counsel? From
where I sit, the answer is "plenty," and this is to say nothing of
the criminal appeals presented by court-appointed attorneys
who should have filed Anders briefs but did not. Pressing ap7. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
8. See id. at 744.
9. 1997 2D CIR. ANN. REP. Table 1 (for year ending September 30, 1997).
10. See Memorandum from Eileen Shapiro, Senior Staff Attorney, United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, to Judge Roger J. Miner 2 (October
16, 1998) (on file with author).
11. See Deborah Pines, Court Denies Payment To Lawyer FilingSloppy Briefs,
N.Y. L. J., May 18, 1993, at 1.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Zuluaga, 981 F.2d 74, 75 (2d Cir. 1992) (per
curiam).
13. See Deborah Pines, Circuit Sees Rise in Volume of Anders Briefs, N.Y. L.
J., Oct. 8, 1992, at 1.
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peals that have no merit in these times of limited appellate
court resources and burgeoning caseloads is especially irresponsible, for it delays the disposition of meritorious cases and
issues.
Why do attorneys go forward with appeals they know they
cannot win? I can suggest several reasons, none of which contributes to the good reputation of the legal profession. Some attorneys pursue these appeals out of the desire to demonstrate to
the client that they are willing to fight to the end; some fear
that another lawyer may take the case on appeal if they do not
and the client thereby will be lost; some think it is necessary to
appeal in order to avoid malpractice claims or, in criminal
cases, to be accused of ineffective assistance; some are guided
solely by their client's wishes; and some, most unfortunately,
are interested only in the billable hours involved.
The Code prohibition against advancing claims unwarranted under existing law carries exceptions for claims that
"can be supported by good faith argument(s) for an extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law."1 4 The exception is an
15
important one. Without it, Brown v. Board of Education
would never have been brought to the Supreme Court. We
must take care, however, not to let the exception swallow the
rule, especially in cases where a change in existing law might
diminish individual rights. I am particularly concerned in this
respect with some public prosecutors and government lawyers
who have a tendency to "push the envelope." We are all aware
of the special duty of prosecutors to protect the innocent 16 but
sometimes the ethical duty of zealousness turns into
overzealousness and thus overcomes considerations of duties to
the adversary, to the court and to the public. When I was a trial
judge, it was my custom to conclude my instructions to the jury
in criminal cases with this well-known aphorism: "Ladies and
Gentlemen, the question here is not whether the government
wins or loses in this case. The government always wins when
justice is done." Very often in our pre-charge conferences, the
prosecuting attorneys would say: "Judge, do you really have to
give that one?" Sometimes, the prosecutor's desire to win
14. N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(2).
15. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16. See N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(2).
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causes him or her to lose sight of the need to see that justice is
done.
I think that the Code of Professional Responsibility should
be taken beyond its present wishy-washy admonition and
should specifically caution government lawyers to exercise especial care when arguing for the elimination of an established
right. I think that the prosecution of appeals that seek to overturn long-standing privileges that the citizenry has come to
know, cherish and rely upon should be characterized and condemned as overzealousness. To seek to shift an appellate court
into activist mode for the purpose of shattering well-grounded
precedent without a particularly compelling reason is to ignore
the special concern that prosecutors must have to see that justice is done and the rights of the public protected.
In a celebrated case, the Supreme Court recently was called
upon to decide whether the attorney-client privilege survives
the death of the client. 17 The decision was one of several necessitated by the activities of the Independent Counsel appointed
to investigate various matters involving the President of the
United States. This case arose out of an investigation of the
dismissal of employees from the White House Travel Office.
Deputy White House Counsel Vincent Foster consulted with an
attorney in private practice, James Hamilton, in regard to the
investigation. Hamilton took several pages of notes during a 2hour meeting with Foster and marked them "Privileged." Foster committed suicide nine days later, and the notes taken by
Hamilton were the subject of a grand jury subpoena issued at
the instance of the Independent Counsel. A motion brought by
Hamilton and his law firm to quash that subpoena ultimately
brought the issue of survival of the attorney-client privilege to
the Supreme Court. The district court quashed the subpoena,
the Independent Counsel appealed, the Circuit reversed,' 8 certiorari was granted, 19 and the Supreme Court reversed the Circuit court.
According to Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
scope of any privilege is to be determined by "the principles of
the common law.., as interpreted by the courts... in the light
17. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998).
18. See In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
19. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1358 (1998).
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of reason and experience." The Court had no difficulty in finding that
[t]he great body of... caselaw supports, either by holding or
considered dicta, the position that the privilege does survive in a
case such as the present one. Given the language of Rule 501, at
the very least the burden is on the Independent Counsel to show
20
that "reason and experience" require a departure from this rule.
Of course, the Independent Counsel made no such showing,
contending only that the attorney-client privilege should not apply in any case where the client is deceased and the information
sought is somehow relevant to a criminal proceeding. No particularized need was demonstrated, and no special circumstances were described. Indeed, no effort was made to justify
this incursion into the entrenched privilege of attorney-client
communication. There certainly was no presentation regarding
reason and experience as justification for departure from the established common law principle. The Supreme Court articulated that principle as follows: "It has been generally, if not
universally, accepted, for well over a century, that the attorneyclient privilege survives the death of the client in a case such as
2
this." 1
The only support that the Independent Counsel could muster for his argument was scholarly criticism and the testamentary exception. In rejecting the views of the scholarly critics,
the Court noted that "even these critics clearly recognize that
established law supports the continuation of the privilege and
22
that a contrary rule would be a modification of common law."
My own general view of scholarly criticism is that it provides
great food for thought but I am usually glad it does not represent controlling law. Also, I recognize that it is rare for academics to extol the status quo. As to the testamentary exception, it
seems to me that its limited purpose - to carry out the intent of
the testator - is very much in the interest of the client. In
other matters, it may very well not be in the client's interest for
the lawyer to reveal confidences imparted to him during the client's lifetime. Referring to an 1897 case 23 wherein it had
20.
21.
22.
23.

Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2085.
Id. at 2087.
Id. at 2086.
See id. at 2085 (discussing Glover v. Patten, 165 U.S. 394, 406-08 (1897)).
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"recogniz[ed] the testamentary exception" but "expressly assumed that the privilege continues after the individual's
death," 24 the Court saw no reason to depart from precedent.
It seems to me that the question of the post-mortem survival of the attorney-client privilege generated more concern in
the general public than any other question presented to the
Supreme Court in recent years. A number of my non-lawyer
friends sought me out to ask how I thought the Supreme Court
would decide. What secrets they had imparted to counsel I do
not know, but their concern was palpable. A number of lawyers
and law students who discussed the question with me expressed
fear that a decision favorable to the Independent Counsel might
foretell the end of the attorney-client privilege entirely. However, the Supreme Court came to the rescue and there was a
large sigh of relief in the land.
How did it come to pass that the question was raised at all?
Partially, at least, it was due to the largely unbridled authority
of the Independent Counsel that was so aptly described by Justice Scalia in his lone but prescient dissent in Morrison v. 01son. 25 I do not perceive that a United States Attorney would
seek to appeal in the first instance or that the Solicitor General
would authorize an appeal in a matter such as this. The ancient privilege invoked is just too important to all Americans,
who take it as an article of faith that lawyers are bound by the
Code to preserve their confidences and secrets even as to matters not covered by the attorney-client privilege. And the Code
does so provide. 26 An attorney faced with a decision whether to
appeal must be concerned with the rules of ethical conduct, and
must recognize that the Code sometimes requires that employment be declined.
I turn now to the ethical duty of candor to the appellate
court. It should go without saying that counsel must not misrepresent the facts or the law when arguing an appeal. 2 7 I could
say that no panel I have ever served on has been subject to such
misrepresentations. I could say that, but it would not be true.
It certainly is rare, since counsel fully understand that a viola24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See N.Y. Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 4.
See N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(a)(5).
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tion of this rule is not only sanctionable but may be fatal to an
appeal. More problematical for some, but not for me, is the rule
requiring the citation of adverse authority.
The Code that I have been tracking in this Lecture provides
that "[iin presenting a matter to a tribunal, a lawyer shall disclose ... [c]ontrolling legal authority known to the lawyer to be
directly adverse to the position of the client and which is not
disclosed by opposing counsel." 28 The American Bar Association
Model Rules of Professional Conduct puts it just a bit differently: "A lawyer shall not knowingly ... fail to disclose to the
tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to
the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and
not disclosed by opposing counsel."29 Although one refers to
controlling authority and the other refers to authority in the
controlling jurisdiction, I think that the result is the same: The
duty to the tribunal supersedes the duty to the client in connection with the disclosure of adverse authority.
Many lawyers are not happy with this rule of conduct.
Their contention is that duty to client is primary and that they
should have no obligation to bring forward anything that may
work to the benefit of the other side.a0 Professor Monroe Freedman, one of my predecessors as Philip Blank Memorial Lecturer, agrees. He has written "that the best and most
appropriate assurance that adverse authorities and arguments
will come out is the adversary system itself."3 1 I must say that I
strongly disagree. No matter how enamored we are of the adversary system as the great engine in the search for truth, we
must recognize its limitations and cabin it with as many rules
as are necessary to maintain as even a playing field as possible.
These rules must include certain responsibilities to the appellate tribunal.
Not all attorneys are equal in skill, and there is no reason
to permit the stronger to play the hidden ball trick with the
weaker. I had hoped that we were moving away from the any28. N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(b)(1).
29. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(3) (1995).
30. See Joanee Pitulla, CourtsAre Getting Tough With Lawyers Who Forget to
Cite Adverse Authority, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1993, at 97.
31. Monroe H. Freedman, Arguing The Law in an Adversary System, 16 GA. L.
REV. 833, 838 (1982).
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thing-goes-for-a-client mindset of the adversary system. I think
that an overly adversarial system is what has led the legal profession into such a sorry state that rules of civility are specifically required. 32 The public has come to expect Rambo-type
litigation because that is what lawyers have led them to expect.
The trend must be reversed! We must not lose sight of the fact
that the purpose of our enterprise is justice under the law and
that anything that moves us away from that purpose, including
33
the non-disclosure of legal precedent, is to be condemned.
My own view is that candor to the tribunal should require
even more than the Rule requires. I think that a lawyer should
cite pertinent authority from other jurisdictions to help the
court in its labors, even if the adversary fails to do so. I also
think that there is no reason to say that it is wrong only for the
lawyer to omit the citation of contrary authority known to him
or her. With modern computer research techniques, precedent
cases are easily knowable to all lawyers. Beyond all this, it may
very well be counterproductive to one's case to omit the citation
of authority, whatever its source. Even Professor Freedman
agrees that "it is tactically desirable for the lawyer to cite and
refute uncited authorities that are arguably adverse. '34 Obviously, a lawyer cannot argue to distinguish, modify or overrule
an adverse precedent not mentioned in the brief but discovered
by the court on its own.
Unfortunately, there are a number of reported cases that
take lawyers to task for omitting pertinent authority. 35 As for
myself, I become very cross, to put it delicately, with lawyers
who try to mislead me in this way. In one case argued before
us, a party who had lost in another circuit on the same issue
presented to us failed to cite the other circuit's decision. The
panel was not pleased. Concluding my observations on the duty
32. See A.B.A. LIT., GUIDELINES FOR LITIGATION CONDUCT, 1998 A.B.A. Lit.
Sec. Pub. 1; Standardsfor Civility in ProfessionalConduct, FED. BAR ASS'N PROF'L.
ETHICS Comm.(1998).
33. See Christopher W. Deering, Candor Toward The Tribunal: Should An
Attorney Sacrifice Truth and Integrity For The Sake Of The Client?, 31 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 59, 88-90 (1997).
34. Freedman, supra note 31, at 838.
35. See, e.g., Eric J. Magnuson, Ethical Issues on Appeal, 19 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 659, 672-79 (1993); J. Michael Medina, Ethical Concerns in Civil Appellate
Advocacy, 43 Sw. L.J. 677, 704-15 (1989).
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of candor, I refer once again to the case involving the postmortem survival of the attorney-client 1rivilege. In his brief to
the Supreme Court, the Independent Counsel writes in the first
sentence of his Summary of Argument: "The court of appeals,
the vast majority of judicial decisions, virtually all leading commentators, and the American Law Institute have properly concluded that the attorney-client privilege should not apply when
the client is deceased." 36 Notwithstanding the testamentary exception, the vast majority of judicial decisions say no such
thing.
It is not enough to be zealous in advancing a client's cause.
The Code specifies that "[a] lawyer should represent a client
competently. '37 Among other things, lawyers are prohibited by
the Code from handling legal matters "without preparation adequate in the circumstances."38 I have become alarmed in recent
years by the increase in the number of briefs and oral arguments that appear to be lacking in adequate preparation on the
law and on the facts. A few months ago, during oral argument,
I asked an assistant state attorney general a factual question
related to the procedural history of the case he was arguing for
the appellee. He answered, somewhat belligerently, "I don't
know the answer to that question; I was not the trial counsel." I
suppose he thought that lack of knowledge of the facts is justified if appellate counsel is different from trial counsel. When
pressed on the question, he reluctantly agreed to furnish the
information in a Rule 28(j) letter. 39 The letter arrived after we
had issued an order favoring the appellant.
Even more depressing is the state of briefing and written
argument on the law. For example, it is surprising how often
parties fail to raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. I
remember a case not long ago when we pressed the jurisdictional question during oral argument, and both counsel insisted
on arguing the merits of the appeal. They wanted to have the
case decided and did not want to be bothered with the issue of
36. Petitioner's Brief at 8, Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. 2081 (No. 97-1192).

37. N.Y.

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon

6.

38. N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A)(2).
39. Rule 28(j) permits a party to advise the court of pertinent and significant
authorities that come to the attention of a party after the party's brief has been
filed or after oral argument but before decision. See FED. R. APP. P. 28(j).
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jurisdiction. They just did not get the point, although they may
have grasped it when the appeal was dismissed, sua sponte, for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. There are a number of decisions on the books dealing with just this sort of dismissal. 40 The
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure require that briefs con41
tain a statement of subject matter and appellate jurisdiction.
I think that often very little thought is given to the importance
of this provision.
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure also require that
briefs "include for each issue a concise statement of the applicable standard of review." 42 The competent attorney will ponder
long and hard over the standard of review applicable to the issues raised. The more restrictive the standard of review, the
less chance there is for reversal on appeal. Accordingly, it is in
the appellate attorney's interest to argue for a standard that is
most favorable to his or her case. And yet we see, time after
time, counsel struggling unsuccessfully to overcome such standard of review barriers as abuse of discretion in matters of law
and clearly erroneous in matters of fact. On innumerable occasions, we have stopped counsel for appellant during oral argument and asked whether findings of fact are under attack.
Instead of getting the point that he or she is now in difficulty
and should proceed to another point, counsel inevitably presses
forward with unwinnable arguments regarding the weight of
the evidence. 43 Basic competence dictates close familiarity with
the standards of review. If those standards cannot be met,
counsel should heed the advice of Professor Hazard: "If the
legal question is not genuinely arguable, the case should not be
there at all."44 This admonition is along the lines of the same
point that I made earlier: The first ethical consideration for an
attorney is whether to take an appeal at all.
Most oral arguments are made by attorneys who "wing it."
The lack of preparation is apparent in these arguments. Counsel often seem to be taken by surprise at a question from the
40. See, e.g., Kahn v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 91 F.3d 385, 387 (2d Cir.
1996); United States v. Johnson, 801 F.2d 597, 601 (2d Cir. 1986).
41. See FED. R. App. P. 28(a)(2), (b).
42. FED. R. App. P. 28(a)(6).
43. See FED. R. Crv. P. 52(a).
44. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Arguing the Law: The Advocate's Duty and Opportunity, 16 GA. L. REV. 821, 829 (1982).
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court. A frequent response is "I'll get to that" by attorneys who
never do. An attorney once responded to my question this way:
"Why do you ask that question, Judge?" A frequent answer to a
question from the court is: "That is not this case." The questioner generally knows that the question assumes facts not in
the case, but may be testing the basis of counsel's theory and its
applicability to future cases. A properly prepared attorney is
ready to distinguish the facts and the law in the question from
those in his or her case.
I think that the waiver of oral argument demonstrates a
lack of professional competence. Although the situation may
change, my court allows oral argument to all who ask for it, except for incarcerated pro se litigants. As a practitioner at the
appellate bar, I would never waive oral argument. Although its
importance has been downplayed in recent times, oral argument presents an unparalleled opportunity to discuss the case
with the court, to get an idea of how the judges are thinking, to
in effect participate in the judges' conference and, what I consider most fascinating, to hear the judges think out loud and
debate the merits among themselves through the medium of
counsel. Many articles have been written about how attorneys
should conduct oral argument, 45 but it seems to me that most
attorneys who argue before us never have read any of them.
While competence in oral argument is greatly to be desired,
competence in the techniques of brief writing, including issue
delineation, is even more desirable. This is because we have the
briefs in hand before, during and after oral argument, and the
impressions they convey are longer-lasting than oral argument.
Many articles also have been written on brief writing, 46 but
these are in the main also ignored. All too often, we see briefs
that are poorly organized, that wander off the point being made,
that make too many points, that have too many citations and
quotations, that are deficient in the citation of authority and
that are highly repetitive. The purpose of a brief, like the purpose of oral argument, is to persuade. Unfortunately, too many
briefs fail to deliver.
45. See, e.g., Roger J. Miner, The Don'ts of OralArgument, in A.B.A. SEC.
APPELLATE PRACTICE MANuAL

PUB.

263 (Priscilla A. Schwab, ed. 1992)

46. See Roger J. Miner, The "Do's" of Appellate Briefwriting, 3
19 (1992).

SCRIBES

J.

OF

LEGAL WRITING
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A recent decision in the Seventh Circuit assures me that I
am not the only appellate judge constrained to read bad briefs
written by lawyers lacking in competence. After indicating that
the brief failed to demonstrate a knowledge of the difference between subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, the
court proceeded to address the nonjurisdictional contentions as
follows: "The first problem with all of these nonjurisdictional
contentions is that [the appellant], in some eleven pages of 'argument,' cites not a single case or statute to support his
47
position."
The court cited one of its earlier cases involving a six-page
brief without any citations in which the panel stated as follows:
"'It is not enough for an appellant in his brief to raise issues;
48
they must be pressed in a professionally responsible fashion.'
It would seem to be a simple thing for lawyers to heed the provision of Appellate Procedure Rule 28(a)(6). The Rule provides
simply that "[t]he argument must contain the contentions of the
appellant on the issues presented, and the reasons therefor,
with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Appellees must comply with similar
49
requirements.
Appellate counsel even have trouble with Anders briefs,
where they are required only to demonstrate that there is no
basis for appeal. In a case that arose after Anders, the Supreme
Court was confronted with a situation in which a state appellate court found an Anders brief inadequate but allowed counsel
to withdraw anyway. 50 On the basis of its own, thorough examination of the record, the state tribunal identified several arguable errors and reversed on one count. The Supreme Court
thought that competent counsel should have been appointed
and faulted the appellate court for failure to do so. 51 In the Sec-

ond Circuit Court of Appeals, a dozen Anders briefs have been
rejected so far this year.5 2
47. Linc Fin. Corp. v. Onwuteaka, 129 F.3d 917, 921 (7th Cir. 1997).
48. Id. (quoting Pearce v. Sullivan, 871 F.2d 61, 64 (7th Cir. 1989)).
49. See FED. R. App. P. 28(b).
50. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988).
51. See id. at 83.
52. See Memorandum from Eileen Shapiro, Senior Staff Attorney, United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, to Judge Roger J. Miner 1 (October
28, 1998) (on file with author).
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There is no reason why counsel should demonstrate incompetence in appellate practice. All counsel have the basic tools to
do the job for their clients. My view on this matter is that the
competence culprit is usually lack of preparation. Procrastination is the hallmark of many attorneys, and the result of procrastination is diminution in the time for preparation. Poor
performance inevitably results under these circumstances.
When my students come to my classes unprepared, I always
give the same admonition: "An unprepared student becomes an
unprepared lawyer, and that works to the detriment of client,
court and justice system."
I would hold appellate attorneys to a high degree of competence. I would hope that their briefs and oral arguments would
meet a higher standard than we have seen in recent years. All
concerned, including the profession, would benefit greatly. It
seems to me that we leave too much "wiggle room" in the competence area. I agree with Professor Griffin in her criticism of the
application to appellate counsel of the rule announced in Strickland v. Washington.53 In Strickland, the Supreme Court established a two-pronged test to be applied when a defendant claims
ineffective assistance of trial counsel in a criminal case. The
defendant must show that his counsel's performance "fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness" 54 and that there was a
"reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional er55
rors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
According to the Court, the objective standard for reasonable
performance is "prevailing professional norms." 56 Circuit courts
have applied the Strickland test to issues of effective assistance
57
of appellate counsel.
Professor Griffin has written that there is no justification
for the second prong of Strickland - the need to show that but
for counsel's errors the result would be different - in identifying ineffective appellate counsel. 58 Most persuasive to me is her
53. 466 U.S. 668 (1994).
54. Id. at 688.
55. Id. at 694.
56. Id. at 688.
57. See, e.g., Jameson v. Coughlin, 22 F.3d 427 (2d Cir. 1994); Mayo v. Henderson, 13 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 1994).
58. See Lissa Griffin, The Right to Effective Assistance of Appellate Counsel, 97
VA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1994).
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statement that "[tihe presence of an actual prejudice requirement distorts the evaluation of performance so that the standard is no longer . . . 'reasonable competence.' 5 9 The
professional duty of competence alone should dictate that one
whose conduct is below "prevailing professional norms" - a low
enough standard in today's world of appellate practice - does
not provide effective assistance to his or her client.
I could go on and on describing briefs and oral arguments
that fall below professional norms, but time does not permit
such a wide-ranging discussion of incompetent performances.
Deputy Solicitor General Lawrence Wallace, who has argued
more cases before the Supreme Court than any other lawyer in
recent times, has said: "If you can't answer the question, 'what
are the strongest points to be made for the other side?' you're
not really prepared to argue the case." 60 I say that too many
appellate lawyers cannot describe the strongest point on either
side. That is why the lack of competence is the number one
problem in appellate practice today, and that is why I agree
with my colleague, Judge Aldisert, that competent representa6 1
tion should be the very first rule of professional responsibility.
The Code tells us that "a lawyer should assist in maintaining the integrity and competence of the legal profession." 62 This
is an admonition not to be taken lightly by appellate practitioners. Maintaining the integrity of the legal profession requires
lawyers to refrain from dishonest and improper conduct and to
report the misconduct of others. 63 It requires complete honesty
to the appellate tribunal. To me, maintaining the integrity of
the legal profession also requires that lawyers adhere to ethical
and moral principles in their dealings with each other. It requires lawyers to cooperate in such matters as adjournments,
waivers of procedural formalities and similar items with which
the client should not be concerned. In my practice days, a client
once "read me the riot act" for agreeing to adjourn the argument
59. Id. at 48.
60. Taking It To The Top: Modern-day Court Record Set, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1998,
at 14.
61. See Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Appellate Bar: Professional Responsibility
and Professional Competence - A View From The JaundicedEye of One Appellate
Judge, 11 CAP. U. L. REV. 445 (1982).

62. N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 1.
63. See N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-101, 1-102, 1-103.
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of an appeal when a colleague had a personal matter to attend
to. My response was that this was my area of responsibility and
did not involve any prejudice to his cause. I am not sure the
client understood, but he did not fire me.
In the United States Courts of Appeals, as in many state
appellate courts, the parties file an appendix containing those
64
parts of the record that are considered pertinent to the appeal.
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure state as follows: "The
parties are encouraged to agree as to the contents of the appendix." 65 More and more, we are seeing parties unable to agree on
a joint appendix. As a result, there is a separate appendix filed
by each party and a concomitant necessity for judges to flip back
and forth between two separate submissions. This negates the
purpose of the Federal Rule. When counsel refuse to cooperate,
additional burdens are imposed upon the court. For example,
there is no reason why a court must consider a motion to adjourn in a case where the reason to do so is compelling. Wasting
the time of the court and the adversary violates the Rule requiring lawyers to maintain the integrity of the profession.
A profession lacking in collegiality is a profession lacking in
integrity. Lawyers are engaged in a joint enterprise, a fact that
is often overlooked in the modern practice of law. Lawyers are
66
responsible for each other, and what one does reflects on all.
When I see briefs that seek sanctions against other lawyers for
bringing or defending appeals that are clearly meritorious,
when I see unfounded accusations of conflict of interest littering
the record, when I hear arguments in which attorneys spend
their allotted time in criticizing each other rather than in arguing the merits, I worry about the integrity of the legal
profession.
Of course, the profession has improved in many ways since
I started to practice law some forty years ago. These improvements have not extended to the collegiality of the Bar, however.
As a young lawyer in my father's office, I was taught that there
would be no charge to a lawyer who came to us for advice or
assistance, that the widows and children of deceased lawyers
64. See FED. R. App. P. 30(a).
65. FED. R. App. P. 30(b).
66. See Roger J. Miner, From The Bench: The Fault Is In Ourselves, 1 NY
LITIGATOR 4, 6-7 (1995).
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were also entitled to services without fee, that attendance at
Bar meetings was mandatory and, horror of horrors, that the
Bar Association's minimum fee schedule must be adhered to.
The passing of the minimum fee schedule may have been a good
thing, but the passing of other indicia of collegiality may be a
real loss. Ten years ago, I wrote an article entitled "Lawyers
Owe One Another."67 In the article, I detailed the neglect of the
duties of honesty, fair dealing, cooperation and civility owed to
lawyers by each other. I find little improvement in these areas
over the last decade. The reputation of the Bar has suffered
accordingly.
In the discharge of the duty to maintain the competence of
the Bar as regards appellate practice, it seems to me that the
Bar should take a greater interest in educational programs devoted to appellate practice. Although some Bar Associations
sponsor courses in appellate practice from time to time, I think
there is a great need for more programs of that kind.
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education has been adopted in
most states, 68 and New York recently was added to the list. 69 I

am hoping that a number of MCLE courses will be devoted to
appellate practice as New York develops its program. Seasoned
appellate lawyers should teach law school courses on the handling of appeals. The widening gulf that has grown between
practitioner and law school teacher makes it especially important that lawyers-to-be get a good grounding in the professional
responsibilities that surround appellate practice. 70
Lawyers may assist in maintaining the professional competence of the Bar in other ways. In olden times, lawyers helped
each other by reviewing briefs and listening to proposed oral
arguments, and I am not referring here to lawyers in the same
firm. In my younger day, I clerked for a short time at a oneperson law firm located in a large office building in downtown
Brooklyn. My employer often would send me down the hall to
67. Roger J. Miner, Lawyers Owe One Another, NAT'L L. J., Dec. 19, 1988, at
13.
68. See Lisa A. Grigg, The Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
Debate: Is it Improving Lawyer Competence or Just Busy Work?, 12 BYU J. PUB.L.
417, 417 n.1 (1998).
69. See N.Y. CT. RULES § 1500 et seq. (McKinney 1999).
70. See Roger J. Miner, A Professionat Risk, 26 INT'L SOC'Y OF BARRISTERS Q.
333 (1991).
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talk to some of the older lawyers in other offices about briefs we
were preparing and to secure their advice. They were happy to
take the time to help a young lawyer. They saw it as helping to
maintain the competence of the profession. In those days,
young lawyers were welcomed to the Bar and helped by older
members in all phases of practice.
I am given to understand that that is not the case today. I
am sure that in large law firms and government offices lawyers
read and comment on appellate briefs prepared by other lawyers who are not working on the particular appeal and provide
moot courts for appellate arguments. Thus is professional competence in appellate practice maintained. Lawyers in different
firms who have no positional conflicts can also help in this way.
It is also important for appellate lawyers to heed the professional duty of assisting and improving the legal system. 71 Nothing pains me more than to hear a lawyer complain about some
court procedure just to vent some steam. We are always willing
in our court to listen to suggestions for improvement from the
Bar. We welcome such suggestions. Several Bar Associations
have committees that regularly submit reports on various defects that they perceive to exist in our system. Each is given
careful consideration. Indeed, we are required, before making
any changes in our local rules of practice, to solicit public
72
comment.
Whether as an individual or as a member of an organized
Bar, we expect that lawyers who engage in appellate practice
will communicate their concerns to us. Just recently, the Federal Courts Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York presented us with a report suggesting changes in
our summary order procedures.7 3 That report, like all others
submitted to us by lawyers or groups of lawyers will receive
close consideration. All courts encourage the performance of
the duty to assist in improving the legal system and I, for one,

71. See N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
72. See FED. R. APP. P. 47(a)(1).

RESPONSIBILITY

Canon 8.

73. See Federal Courts Comm., The Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York,
REPORT ON THE CITATION OF SUMMARY ORDERS (1998).
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think that the lawyers are not critical enough of the courts
74
before which they practice.
It seems to me that appellate judges do not do enough to
advance the cause of professional responsibility in appellate
practice. I do not know how many robing room conversations I
have had with colleagues when they (or I) have made such comments as, "that was a terrible argument" or "the brief made no
sense" or "counsel missed the controlling case" or "the facts
were not correctly represented to us" or "the statutory interpretation urged upon us was totally without support." Despite the
frequency of these comments, it is a rare case in which we sanc75
tion even those who take frivolous appeals.
Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure allows
us to "award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee" if we determine that an appeal is frivolous. Rule 38
sanctions are sometimes assessed against both attorney and client, because, as we say, "attorney and client are in the best position between them to determine who caused [the] appeal to be
taken."76 Such sanctions are to be applied where an appeal "is
totally lacking in merit, framed with no relevant supporting
law, conclusory in nature and utterly unsupported by the evidence." 77 Appeals that are meritless but not frivolous do not
qualify for the sanctions. 78 Perhaps that is putting too fine a
point on it, because appeals that are totally lacking in merit are
by definition frivolous.
Aside from the occasional sanction of a lawyer for taking a
frivolous appeal, appellate judges generally ignore violations of
ethical norms. 79 By doing so, they are in great part responsible
for the problems of which they complain. Appellate judges have
a positive obligation to monitor, encourage and enforce adher-

74. See Roger J. Miner, The Duty to Criticize the Courts, 71 JUDICATURE 134
(1987).
75. See, e.g., Bartel Dental Books Co. v. Schultz, 786 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1986).
76. United States v. Potamkin Cadillac Corp., 689 F.2d 379, 382 (2d Cir.
1982).
77. Id. at 381.
78. See JC's East, Inc. v. Traub, 92 F.3d 26, 26 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
79. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between The Bar And The State, 70 N.C. L.
REV. 1389, 1413 (1992).
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ence to standards of professional responsibility. 0 They should
not shirk that obligation because it is so important to our system of justice.
There are many methods by which appellate judges can encourage and enforce ethical rules. For example, the Tenth Circuit recently invoked Rule 46(c) of the Rules of Appellate
Procedure to sanction an attorney for what the court described
as "egregious mischaracterizations of the record."8 1 Rule 46(c)
allows a court of appeals to "take any appropriate disciplinary
action against any attorney who practices before it for conduct
unbecoming a member of the bar or for failure to comply with
these rules or any rule of the court." Unfortunately, my court
has not made use of this Rule 46(c) for many years. The presentation of an appeal without competent briefing or argument and
the failure to cite known and adverse precedent, in violation of
the Code, certainly can be characterized as conduct unbecoming
a member of the bar, and may even violate rules of the court.
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure also authorize
courts of appeals to suspend or disbar attorneys from practice in
82
their courts for "conduct unbecoming a member of the bar."
We have a local rule setting forth procedures for disbarment or
suspension,8 3 but it is seldom invoked for misconduct in our
court. We merely track disciplinary actions taken by state
courts and rubber stamp their decisions. A committee has been
established in our court to which we may refer accusations of
misconduct for investigation, hearing and report.8 4 I have yet to
serve on a panel that has referred any business to that committee. In one recent case, a panel of our court did direct the clerk
to forward to state grievance committees for appropriate action
an order affirming a district court sanction order that noted
prior sanctions and admonitions to counsel for unprofessional
conduct in our court.8 5
80. See Jerome J. Shestack, Advancing ProfessionalismNeeds Judicial Help,
A.B.A. J., Apr. 1998, at 8.
81. James v. Grand Lake Mental Health Center, No. 97-5157, 1998 WL
664315, at *10 (10th Cir. Sept. 24, 1998).
82. FED. R. APP. PROC. 46(h).
83. See 2D CIR. R. 46(h).
84. See 2D CIR. R. 46(h)(2).
85. See Kramer v. Arms, No. 96-7448, 1997 WL 85830, at *2 (2d Cir. Feb 27,
1997).
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From time to time, judges hint in their opinions that a malpractice action against appellate counsel might be an option. A
malpractice action generally is not a good way to enforce professional responsibility in appellate practice because a successful
suit requires proof that the underlying appeal would have been
successful.8 6 An interesting malpractice action now pending
arises out of a claim that counsel made a mess out of his argument before the United States Supreme Court.8 7 The vote in
the Supreme Court was 5-4,88 but counsel for the plaintiff in the
malpractice case will have a difficult time proving that a good
argument would have changed the swing vote. I wonder
whether the plaintiff will call any Justices as witnesses. If a
litigant can require the President to be a witness, why not a
Justice of the Supreme Court?
I think that some of the disciplinary sanctions that can be
used for Code enforcement ought to be applied to supervisory
lawyers. The Code that I have been referring to imposes upon
lawyers who supervise other lawyers responsibility for ethical
violations if the supervisor "knows or should have known of the
conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action."8 9 Adherence to the Code is a collective responsibility, and those who
manage lawyers in large law offices, private or governmental,
should be responsible for keeping the faith of professional responsibility. According to a recent article in the American Bar
Association Journal, New York is "the only state to have a set of
disciplinary rules explicitly governing law firm conduct" and is
"likely to remain the only state."90 The fact that many law firms
throughout the land oppose provisions for supervisory responsibility reflects discredit upon the profession.
I think that there are kinder, gentler ways for appellate
judges to encourage lawyers to perform their professional responsibilities, and I strongly urge my colleagues to pursue these
86. See RIcHARD H. UNDERWOOD & WILLIAM H. FORTUNE, TRIAL ETHICS § 19.4,
at 555-56 (1988).
87. See Tony Mauro, CallingA Bad Day In Court Malpractice?,LEGAL TIMES,
July 20, 1998, at 7.
88. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
89. N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-104(A)(2).
90. Mark Hansen, Taking a Firm Hand in Discipline, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1998, at
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ways. Appellate judges should take a greater interest in law
school education in appellate practice. They should teach law
school courses in appellate practice and ethics. They should lecture on these subjects and take part as teachers in continuing
legal education programs. They should attend Bar Association
meetings and interact with lawyers who practice in their courts.
Bar Association social occasions present excellent opportunities
for judges and lawyers to meet. 9 1 The large Bar Associations in
New York City, such as the Federal Bar Council and the Association of the Bar, present judges with these opportunities, and
judges frequently attend their events. I think that perhaps
there has been too much interaction with the large Bar Associations. Appellate judges should save some time to get around to
smaller Bar groups for educational as well as social events.
My experience has been that appellate lawyers are anxious
to talk to appellate judges. Judges should use such discussions
to talk about ethical standards and the importance of adhering
to them. I think that it is important for appellate judges to compliment lawyers on good arguments and good briefs. We do this
but not often enough. These compliments show our recognition
of the lawyer's compliance with Code requirements of competence. I think we should include such remarks in our published
opinions on a regular basis, as we should include remarks that
are critical of lawyer conduct. We should also note in writing
those situations where a lawyer has gone out of his or her way
to extend courtesies to opposing counsel and where adverse authority has been cited. I have said many times in the past that
we are all in this together. This is best exemplified by a longstanding tradition of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in Richmond, Virginia. Following oral argument
there, the judges come down from the bench and shake hands
with counsel. 92 It seems to me that the closer the relationship
between appellate judge and appellate lawyer, the greater will
be lawyer awareness of the Rules of ethical conduct required in
appellate practice. Appellate judges have an important duty
here. Judicial ethics compel the performance of a great number
of other duties as well. But that is a Lecture for another day.

91. See RICHARDSON R. LYNN, APPELLATE LITIGATION § 3.10, at 76 (1985).
92. See Louis H. Pollak, Professional Attitude, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1998, at 67.
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